Payment schemes in random-termination experimental games by Katerina Sherstyuk et al.
Payment schemes in random-termination
experimental games∗
By Katerina Sherstyuk† , Nori Tarui‡ , Majah-Leah Ravago§
and Tatsuyoshi Saijo ¶
March 2011
Abstract
We consider payment schemes in experiments that model inﬁnite-horizon games by
using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods
of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of
the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization
and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last-period payment schemes induce
preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last-
period payment is also robust under diﬀerent attitudes towards risk. In comparison,
paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias.
Experimentally, we ﬁnd that the cumulative payment appears the best in inducing
long-sighted behavior.
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Signiﬁcant attention in experimental research is recently paid to dynamic inﬁnite-horizon
settings. Such settings have been used to study asset markets (Camerer and Weigelt 1993),
growth models (Lei and Noussair 2002), games with overlapping generations of players (Of-
ferman et al. 2001), and inﬁnitely-repeated games (Dal Bo 2005). To model inﬁnite-horizon
games with discounting, experimental researchers use the random termination method: given
that a period is reached, the game continues to the next period with a ﬁxed probability p.
Experimental research shows that the random termination method is indeed more successful
in representing inﬁnite-horizon games than continuing a game for a ﬁnite, known or unknown
to subjects, number of periods (Oﬀerman et al. 2001; Dal Bo 2005).
The inﬁnite-horizon models assume that the subjects maximize the inﬁnite sum of their
discounted payoﬀs across periods, and thus call for paying the subjects cumulatively for
all periods. Indeed, such cumulative payment schemes are used in all studies cited above.
However, the cumulative payment has two limitations. First, a random-termination game
that continues into the next period with probability p is theoretically equivalent to an inﬁnite-
horizon game with the discount factor p only under the assumption of risk neutrality. Risk
aversion may invalidate the cumulative payment scheme, at least theoretically. Second, a
possible concern for researchers is that large variations in the actual number of periods
realized under random termination may result in large variations in cumulative payments to
subjects, even when per period earnings are fairly predictable. Furthermore, to preserve the
incentives, researchers in some cases have to pay the same stream of cumulative payoﬀs to
more than one experimental participant. For example, in the growth experiment by Lei and
Noussair (2002), a horizon that did not terminate within a scheduled session time continued
during the next session; if a substitute took place of the original subject in the continuation
session, then both the substitute and the original subject were paid the amount of money that
the substitute made. In the inter-generational inﬁnite-horizon dynamic game experiment by
Sherstyuk et al. (2009), each period game was played by a new generation of subjects, who
were paid their own payoﬀs plus the sum of the payoﬀs of all their successors. Such payment
scheme, while necessary to induce proper dynamic incentives, produced a snowball eﬀect on
the experimenter expenditures.
The objective of this paper is to explore payment schemes that may provide a reason-
able alternative to cumulative payments in random-termination games. Ideally, we seek a
payment method that would allow for various attitudes towards risk, and at the same time
reduce variability of the experimenter budget.
We explore two alternatives to the cumulative payment scheme, and their consequences
1for subject motivation in random-termination games. One alternative is the random selection
payment method (Davis and Holt 1993) that is often used in individual choice or strategic
game experiments containing multiple tasks. Each subject is paid based on one task, or a
subset of tasks, chosen randomly at the end of the experiment (e.g., Charness and Rabin
2002; Chen and Li 2009). Aside from avoiding wealth and portfolio eﬀects that may emerge
if subjects are paid for each task (Holt 1986; Cox 2010),1 there are also added advantages in
economizing on the data collection eﬀorts (Davis and Holt, 1993).
Another alternative to the cumulative payment is the last period payment, under which
the subjects are paid for the last realized period of the game. We show that, theoretically,
paying the subjects their earnings for just the last period of the horizon induces preferences
that are equivalent, under expected utility representation, to maximizing the inﬁnite sum
of discounted utilities across periods. Moreover, unlike the cumulative payment, it does not
require risk neutrality.
In Section 2, we present a theoretical comparison of the three payment methods discussed
above. In Sections 3 and 4, we compare the payment alternatives experimentally. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theory
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic game, where t = 1,.. refers to the period of the game.
Let δ be a player’s discount factor (0 < δ < 1) and πt the player’s period-wise payoﬀ in






To implement such dynamic game in economic laboratory, experimenters have their subjects
play the game where one period is followed by the next in a matter of a few minutes, and
hence the subjects’ time preference would not matter. Instead, the discount factor is induced
by the possibility that the game may terminate at the end of each period.2 The following
1Holt (1986) shows that the random selection method may be used if subjects behave in accordance with
the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Several carefully designed experiments give reassuring
evidence for using the random selection method in individual choice experiments (Starmer and Sugden 1991;
Cubitt et. al. 1998; Hey and Lee 2005). We are unaware of studies that test the validity of the random
selection method in game theory experiments.
2Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 148) note that the discount factor in an inﬁnitely repeated game can
represent pure time preference, or the possibility that the game may terminate at the end of each period.
2random termination rule is used: given that period t is reached, the game continues to the
next period t + 1 with probability p (such that 0 < p < 1). Then the game ends in the ﬁrst
period with probability 1 − p, the second period with probability p(1 − p), the third with
probability p2(1−p), and so on. The following describes the induced discount factor for each
subject under alternative payment schemes.
Assume risk neutrality ﬁrst. Implications of risk aversion will be discussed at the end of
this section.
Cumulative payment scheme Suppose the subjects are informed that if the game ends
in period T, then each subject receives the sum of the period-wise payoﬀs from all realized
periods 1,...,T. Given the random variable T, the expected payoﬀ to a player is given by:
(1 − p)π1 + p(1 − p)[π1 + π2] + p
2(1 − p)[π1 + π2 + π3] + ...
= π1
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Thus p (equal to one minus the termination probability) represents the period-wise discount
factor. With p set equal to δ, the expected payoﬀ under the cumulative payment scheme is
equivalent to U, the payoﬀ under the original dynamic game given in equation (1).
Random payment scheme Under this scheme, the payoﬀ to each subject, if the game ends
in period T, is randomly chosen from all the realized period-wise returns over T periods,
π1,π2,...,πT. Then the expected payoﬀ is:
(1 − p)π1 + p(1 − p)
1
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This implies a discount factor that is diﬀerent from the one given under the objective function
displayed in equation (1). In particular, the random payment induces players to discount
3future returns more heavily than the cumulative payment. Therefore, the subjects are ex-
pected to be more myopic under the random payment. To see this, normalize the discount




1 = 1 − p,δ
c
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discount factors under the random payment rules, δr
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Then we observe that
δ
c
1 = 1 − p < δ
r
1 for any p between 0 and 1,
i.e. the random payment rule places a higher weight on the current payment irrespective of
the termination probability.
Figure 1 illustrates the normalized discount factor schedules with p = 3/4 (the value used
in our experiments). The ﬁgure veriﬁes that the random payment rule puts a larger weight
on the initial period than the cumulative payment does.
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
We further note that the random payment rule induces time inconsistency. This is
because, as equation (3) indicates, the periodwise discount factor δr
t+1/δr
t changes across
periods. The optimal plan this period becomes suboptimal in the next period. This would
be another undesirable feature of this payment rule.
Is there any payment scheme, other than the cumulative one, that induces the same
discounting as the objective function (1)? We now demonstrate that such discounting can
be achieved by paying each subject based on their last period.
Last-period payment scheme Each subject receives the payoﬀ for the last period T.
With probability (1 − p) the game lasts for only one period and the subject receives π1.
4With probability (1 − p)p the game lasts for exactly 2 periods and the subject receives π2,
etc. Hence, the subject’s expected payoﬀ is
(1 − p)π1 + p(1 − p)π2 + p





This is exactly (1 − p) times the expected payoﬀ for the cumulative payment case.
Hence, the theory predicts that, up to the normalization factor (1 − p), the incentives
induced under the last period payment are the same as those induced under the cumulative
payment, with both being consistent with the objective function (1).
If the payoﬀs are replaced by utilities, and if the subject’s utility is concave in the payoﬀs,
then the above equivalence result does not hold. Speciﬁcally, the subject’s expected utility
under the cumulative payment scheme is not equivalent to U, the subject’s utility in the
inﬁnite-horizon setup deﬁned in equation (1). This discrepancy implies that the subjects
would behave more myopically under the cumulative payment scheme than what the payoﬀ
speciﬁcation U would predict. This has been pointed out in the literature (e.g. Lei and
Noussair 2002);3 Appendix B presents the proof of this statement for the dynamic game
considered in Section 3. However, as it is obvious from equation (4), the subject’s expected
utility under the last-period payment scheme is still equivalent to U deﬁned in equation (1).
Therefore, provided that the subjects may be risk averse, the last-period payment scheme
induces the players’ objective function under the original dynamic game more accurately
than the cumulative payment scheme.
3 Game setting and experimental design
We now present experimental evidence on the eﬀect of payment schemes on subject behavior
from the following inﬁnite-horizon games with dynamic externalities. This game has been
studied in Dutta and Radner (2009) and in Sherstyuk et al. (2009) to address the problem
of climate change mitigation among countries.
Model settings There are N ≥ 2 players. In each period t = 1,2,..., each player i
chooses an action (emission level) xit, where 0 ≤ xit ≤ ¯ x, and ¯ x > 0 represents each player’s
maximum feasible action. Emission xit generates current beneﬁts to player i in period t, but
increases the global pollution stock S that imposes a negative dynamic externality on all
players. The period-wise return of player i, πi, in period t consists of two components: the
3In the context of a growth model, Lei and Noussair (2002) note that risk averse agents would behave
more myopically as they would underweight the future uncertain payoﬀs relative to the risk neutral agents.
5beneﬁt from its own action, Bi(xit), and the damages due to the existing pollution stock,
Di(St):
πi(xit,St) = Bi(xit) − Di(St). (5)
We assume that all players have the same return functions and omit the player subscript from
the return functions in what follows. The beneﬁt function is quadratic, B(x) = ax − 1
2cx2,
and the damage function is linear, D(St) = dSt, where the parameter d > 0 represents the
marginal damages due to the stock of pollution.
The pollution stock S evolves across periods according to the following equation:
St+1 = λSt + Xt, t = 0,1,..., (6)
where λ ∈ [0,1] represents the retention rate of the pollution stock, and Xt ≡
 
i xit is the
total emission. The initial stock S0 is given.
Given a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), player i’s payoﬀ is given by the present value of the
period-wise returns
 ∞
t=0 δtπi(xit,St). There is no uncertainty in the model. In each period,
each player observes the history of pollution stock levels and all players’ previous actions.
We consider the following benchmark solutions to the model.
First Best solution (FB): This cooperative emission allocation maximizes the sum







tπi(xit,St) subject to the constraints (6). (7)






With the linear damage function, the solution is constant over periods and hence independent
of stock level. The solution satisﬁes B′(x∗
it) =
δNd
1−δλ for all i,t. Given inﬁnite horizon, the
folk theorem for dynamic games (Dutta 1995) implies that, under some parameter values,
the ﬁrst best outcome is supportable as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome (e.g. with
Nash reversion trigger strategies).
Markov Perfect equilibrium (MP): There are many subgame perfect equilibria in
this dynamic game. In a Markov perfect equilibrium, each player conditions its action in
each period only on the current pollution stock. For the above model speciﬁcation, there
exists a unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a simple form where each player’s action is
independent of the pollution stock (and hence constant). The solution is given by {˜ xi}N
i=1
such that B′(˜ xi) =
δd
1−λδ for all i. We focus on this Markov perfect equilibrium (MP) as
a natural benchmark for the noncooperative outcome where the players take the dynamic
externalities into account.
6Myopic Nash solution (MN): If the dynamic externality is ignored by players, as in
the case with δ = 0, then the Nash equilibrium action of player i, ˆ xi, solves B′(ˆ xi) = 0. We
call {ˆ xi}N
i=1 the Myopic Nash (MN) solution.
Experimental parameters Groups consisting of N = 3 subjects each participated in
sequences of decision periods. The following parameter values were used in the experiment:
a = 208, c = 13, d = 26.867, λ = 0.3, δ = 0.75, implying the following stationary per person
emissions, as discussed above: First Best (FB): x∗ = 10; Markov Perfect (MP): ˜ x = 14, and
Myopic Nash (MN): ˆ x = 16. (The player’s subscript is dropped here.) The starting stock
S0 was set at the First Best steady state level.
Given these parameter values, a Nash-reversion trigger strategy where a deviation results
in MP strategies supports the First Best solution as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
(see Appendix A).
In each decision period, each subject in a group chose between 1 and 11 tokens, which
were translated into the emission levels using the following linear transformation function:
xit = 2yit + 2, where yit is subject i’s token choice in period t. This allowed to reduce the
subject decision space to 11 choices. The parameter values are chosen so that all theoretical
benchmarks (First Best: yi = 4; Markov Perfect: yi = 6; and Myopic Nash: yi = 7) for indi-
vidual token investments are distinct from each other and integer-valued. The cooperative
FB outcome path gives the subjects substantially higher expected stream of payoﬀs than the
MN or the MP outcome.
Treatments To study the eﬀects of payment schemes on subject behavior, we consid-
ered the following three treatments which diﬀered in the way the subject total payoﬀs were
determined. (As before, T denotes the last realized period in the game):
1. Cumulative payment: Each subject receives the sum of the period-wise returns from
all periods 1,...,T.
2. Random-period payment: The payoﬀ to each subject is randomly chosen from all the
realized period-wise returns over T periods.
3. Last-period payment: Each subject receives the period-wise return in period T, i.e.
the last realized period, as the payoﬀ.
Based on the analysis from Section 2, we hypothesize that the Random-period payment
treatment should result in more myopic (higher) token choices than either the Cumulative
or the Last-period payment treatments. The Cumulative and the Last-period treatments
7should result in the same token choices, provided the subjects are risk neutral. If the subjects
are risk averse, then the theory (see Appendix B) suggests the actions will be more myopic
(imply higher token choices and higher steady state pollution stock) under the Cumulative
payment than under the Last-period payment.
Procedures The experiments were computerized using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Several (up to three) independent groups of subjects, with three subjects in each group, par-
ticipated in each experimental session. The actual game was preceded by experimental
instructions (included in the Supplementary materials) and ﬁve-period training for which
the subjects were paid a ﬂat training fee. Groups of subjects made token decisions in all
decision periods until the game stopped.4 To help with decision-making, the subjects were
provided with payoﬀ calculators, as well as tabular and graphical information about the
current payoﬀs from own token choices and the eﬀect of group token choices on future pe-
riods’ payoﬀs; see Figure 3 in Appendix C. In addition, to help the subjects coordinate on
outcomes, at the conclusion of each period the subjects were asked to suggest token levels
and type verbal advice to other group members. These procedures were the same in all three
treatments of the experiment.
A randomization device (an eight-sided die or a bingo cage) was used after each period to
determine whether the game continued to the next period. Given δ = 0.75, the continuation
probability was set at 3/4, implying the expected length of 4 period in each game. Only
one dynamic game per group was conducted in each session. We chose not to restart short
games if they ended early, for the reason that it could have an eﬀect on subject motivation
in each game. At the end of the session, each subject responded to a short post-experiment
survey (included in the Supplementary materials) which contained questions about one’s
major, the number of economics courses taken, and the reasoning behind token choices in
the experiment.
We allowed enough time for each session to guarantee that each game terminated within
the allocated time interval. Experimental sessions lasted up to three hours each, including
4In the instructions, each period was called a “series.” Each period consisted of three decision trials. At
the end of the period, one of the trials was chosen randomly as a paid trial, and was used to determine
next period’s stock level. Having more than one trial in a period allowed the subjects to better learn the
behavior of other subjects in their group, while reducing the dynamic externalities (eﬀect on next period’s
stock) from such learning. As the number of trials is ﬁxed and known to subjects, it does not change the
subject motivation in the way a random or an unknown number of trials would. Our data indicate that the
subject decisions were rather consistent across trials within periods. In what follows, we will therefore focus
on the data analysis for the chosen (paid) trials of each period; see Section 4 below.
8instructions and training. The exchange rates were set at $100 experimental = $1 US in the
Cumulative treatment, and $30 experimental = $1 US in the Last-period and the Random-
period treatments.5 The average payment was $32.24 per subject, including $10 ﬂat training
fee.
4 Results
The experiments were conducted at the University of Hawaii at Manoa between June 2008
and June 2010. The total of 81 subjects participated; they were undergraduate students,
with about a half majoring in social sciences or business. The mean number of economics
courses taken by the participants was 1.5 in the Cumulative treatment, 1.67 in the Last-
period treatment, and 1.27 in the Random-period treatment; in all treatments, the median
number of economics courses taken was one.
Six to ﬁfteen independent dynamic games, with three participants each, were conducted
per treatment. Some games ended after the ﬁrst period. The data analysis revealed no
diﬀerences in ﬁrst-period token choices among any two treatments; for this reason, we exclude
one-period-long games from the analysis, and focus on the games that lasted for at least two
periods. This leaves us with six independent observations (games) per treatment.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics by treatment, focusing on per period group token
contributions. Figure 2 shows the group token dynamics across periods by treatment. Lower
token levels imply more long-sighted, i.e., less myopic, behavior. Three theoretical bench-
marks, given p = 3/4, are also exhibited on the graphs: First Best, or Socially Optimal
group tokens, FB=12; Markov Perfect Equilibrium group tokens, MP=18; and Myopic Nash
Equilibrium group tokens, MN=21.
TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
The table and the ﬁgure suggest a few observations. First, in contrast to the theoretical
prediction under risk neutrality, the subject behavior under the Last-period payment was
quite diﬀerent from the behavior under the Cumulative payment. Although the overall
average group tokens were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the Cumulative and the Last-
period payment (13.56 group tokens under Cumulative as compared to 14.17 under Last-
period), the variance of group tokens across games was much lower under the Cumulative
than under the Last-period payment: 1.49 tokens as compared to 5.61 tokens, respectively.
5We set the exchange rates in the Cumulative, the Random-period and the Last-period treatments based
on pilot runs, so that the average payments to subjects would be about the same in all treatments.
9Furthermore, group tokens under the Cumulative payment exhibited a decreasing trend over
time; groups invested on average 16.17 tokens in the ﬁrst period, as compared to 12.5 tokens
in the last period (p=0.0938, Wilcoxon sign rank test). This suggests that the subjects
in this treatment were learning to play more long-sightedly as the game progressed. In
contrast, the group tokens did not signiﬁcantly change from the ﬁrst to the last period under
the Last-period payment; the groups invested, on average, 14.33 tokens in the ﬁrst period,
as compared to 15.5 tokens in the last period. Consequently, while the tokens in the ﬁrst
period were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between these two treatments, they became diﬀerent
at 10% signiﬁcance level in the last period of the game (p=0.066, Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney
rank sum test).
The post-experimental questionnaire conﬁrms the observed diﬀerence in behavior be-
tween the Cumulative and the Last-period treatments: The mean response to the question
“How many tokens would you order if you are to participate again in this experiment?”
was 4.11 tokens in the Cumulative treatment, and 5.17 tokens in the Last-period treatment;
the median responses were 4 and 5.5 tokens for the Cumulative and for the Last-period
treatments, respectively. We summarize:
Observation 1 Subject behavior under the Cumulative payment was less variable than under
the Last-period payment. Further, group tokens decreased from the ﬁrst to the last period
under the Cumulative payment, indicating a tendency towards a less myopic behavior. No
such tendency was observed under the Last-period payment.
Next, our experimental data suggest that, consistent with the theoretical predictions, the
subjects behaved more myopically under the Random-period pay treatment than under the
Cumulative payment treatment. While the ﬁrst period group tokens were no diﬀerent under
these two treatments, all other descriptive statistics, including average group tokens, the
tokens in the last periods, and the average group tokens in early and late periods were all
statistically diﬀerent (higher) at 5% (and often at 1%) signiﬁcance level under the Random-
period treatment than under the Cumulative treatment. Unlike under the Cumulative pay-
ment, the group tokens did not signiﬁcantly change from the ﬁrst (16.17 tokens average)
to the last period (18.17 tokens average) under the Random-period payment; clearly, there
was no decreasing trend in the token levels. The overall average group tokens under the
Random-period payment were at 17.83, the highest among all three treatments, which was
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Cumulative group token average (p=0.0076, WMW test). We
also note that the variance of average tokens across games in the Random-period payment
treatment was 2.42, which was higher than in the Cumulative treatment, but lower than
in the Last-period treatment. Finally, the mean response to the post-experiment question
10“How many tokens would you order if you are to participate again in this experiment?” in
the Random treatment was 5.22 tokens, and the median was 6 tokens; both were the highest
among all three treatments.6 In sum,
Observation 2 Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the subjects behaved more myopi-
cally under the Random-period payment treatment than under the Cumulative payment.
Finally, the subjects behavior under the Last-period and the Random-period payment
treatments also appears quite diﬀerent, although the diﬀerences are statistically insigniﬁcant.
The latter is likely due to a large variation in the Last-period treatment observations across
individual games. On average, however, the diﬀerences are in the direction predicted by the
theory discussed in Section 2, with Last-period average group tokens at a lower (less myopic)
level of 14.17, as compared to Random-period average group tokens of 17.83.
5 Summary
To summarize, comparison of the three payment schemes studied in the context of dynamic
games with random termination indicate the following. In line with the theoretical predic-
tion, the Random-period pay treatment results in more myopic behavior than the Cumulative
payment. This is likely due to a higher discounting induced by the Random-period payment
in combination with random termination.
Further, the Cumulative payment and the Last-period payment schemes imply, under
risk neutrality, the same discount factor theoretically, but appear to be quite diﬀerent be-
haviorally. Speciﬁcally, the Cumulative payment appears to induce less noisy and more
long-sighted behavior than the Last-period payment.
We brieﬂy discuss several hypotheses that could potentially explain the diﬀerences be-
tween the Cumulative and the Last-period payment treatments:
1. Risk aversion. The diﬀerences in behavior between the Cumulative and the Last-period
payment treatments are unlikely to be explained by subject risk aversion alone. The theo-
retical analysis (Appendix B) indicates that if the subjects are risk averse, then the steady
6Advices that the subjects sent to their group members at the conclusion of periods give additional support
that the random selection of the paid period made the subjects reason more myopically. For example, one of
the subjects (ID 5, Game 1, Random treatment) sent the following advice to his group members: “7 again.
Hope it ends by now and the series 1 is selected !!!” In comparison, many subjects in the Cumulative and in
the Last-period treatments advised their group members to restrain token levels for the beneﬁt of the future
payoﬀs. E.g.: “I think the best number to order is 4 because that way you get the most consistent payoﬀ
from trial to trial no matter how long it goes.” (ID 4, Game 2, Cumulative treatment).
11state stock level for the dynamic game considered would be higher under the Cumulative
payment than under the Last-period payment. This would imply that if our participants
are risk averse, they would invest more tokens under Cumulative than under the Last-period
payment treatment. Yet, we observe the opposite.
2. Risk aversion combined with wealth eﬀects. Following Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p.
192), “it is a common contention that wealthier people are willing to bear more risk than
poor people.” If experimental subjects exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion over the
payoﬀ ranges used in the experiment, then accumulated payoﬀs in the Cumulative payment
may make people less risk averse, leading to lower token investments in later periods. In
contrast, as no payoﬀs are accumulated under the Last-period payment, no decreasing trend
in tokens should be expected. This is consistent with what we observe in our experiments.
3. Risk aversion combined with higher stakes for each decision under the Last-period
payment as compared to the Cumulative payment. Holt and Laury (2002) demonstrate that
higher stakes lead to greater risk aversion. Theoretically, this may be explained by prefer-
ences that exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion. If
our experimental subjects are inﬂuenced by the stakes per decision, then they may choose
higher (less risky) token levels under the Last-period payment as compared to the Cumu-
lative payment because of higher per-period stakes under the Last-period payment. This is
consistent with our experimental observations.
4. Diﬀerences between treatments in subjective probabilities of the game ending after
each given period. This cannot be ruled out, although we do not have a reasonable expla-
nation for why the payment rule would aﬀect subject perception about the game ending.7
5. Unobserved diﬀerences (such as in the degree of sophistication) between participants
in the Cumulative and the Last-period pay treatments. As discussed at the beginning of
Section 4, the mean and median numbers of economics courses taken by the subjects are
indistinguishable between any two treatment. This gives us grounds to believe that the
subjects’ levels of economic reasoning should be comparable across treatments.
6. Speciﬁcity of the dynamic game employed in our experimental design. The dynamic
7Responses to post-experiment questionnaire indicate that some subjects may have believed that the
probability of the game ending increased over periods. However, this was not speciﬁc to any one of the
treatments. Here are some examples of subject responses: Question: “What do you think is the best number
of tokens to order and why?” Answer: “Lower ﬁrst, then higher” (ID 1, Game 1, Random-period payment
treatment). Question: “How did you make your decision to order [tokens]?” Answer: “Begin conservatively
and gradually order in more aggressive numbers because there is a higher possibility that the experiment
might end as you go along..” (ID 3, Game 3, Cumulative treatment). We do not have suﬃcient evidence to
reject the hypothesis that the subjective probabilities of the game ending were the same across treatments.
12externality game that we use is rather complex along several dimensions. First, unlike a
repeated game, it evolves from period to period. Second, the action space in each period
consists of eleven choices, which adds complexity as compared to, for example, a binary
choice game. It is possible that the Last-period payment scheme could work better in in-
ducing dynamic incentives in a simple two-by-two repeated game, such as the Prisoners’
dilemma. It is also possible that the diﬀerences in subject behavior observed under the two
payment schemes would disappear with more experienced subjects. What our experimental
evidence suggests, however, is that in contrast to the theoretical predictions, there are dy-
namic settings for which the Last-period payment cannot be relied upon to induce dynamic
incentives as well as, or better, than the Cumulative payment.
There is insuﬃcient evidence to distinguish which of the above factors are responsible
for the diﬀerences between the Cumulative and the Last-period payment schemes within the
framework of this study. We conjecture that risk aversion, wealth eﬀects, stakes and game
complexity all may play a role. However, we may draw two conclusions from our research.
First, neither the Last-period payment nor the Random-period payment are reliable alter-
natives to the Cumulative payment scheme in inducing long-sighted incentives in dynamic
games. Second, the Random-period payment appears to be a good alternative to the Cumu-
lative payment for repeated (or more generally dynamic) settings where experimenters seek
to minimize the repeated game eﬀects and focus experimental subjects’ attention solely on
the decisions in the current decision period. Examples of the latter may include auctions,
markets, and other settings, where repetition is needed for subjects to gain experience with
the game, but the supergame eﬀects which come from repetition are to be minimized.
Appendix A
Supporting the ﬁrst best solution with a trigger strategy
Can cooperation be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome given the parameter
































13Consider a trigger strategy where deviation from x∗ by a player induces the Markov perfect
equilibrium proﬁle (where every player chooses   x forever). Suppose a player deviates from
cooperation in period 1 (or any period preceded by a history of cooperative play). With the















Then, under the MP actions, the stock level evolves according to St+1 = St +   X:
S0 = S
d, S1 = λS
d +   X, S2 = λS1 +   X = λ
2S
d + (1 + λ)   X,...
St = λ
tS
d + (1 + λ + ··· + λ
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Given the parameter values speciﬁed for the experiment, we have Π∗ ≈ 1,114 as the payoﬀ
upon cooperation and V d ≡ maxxd≥0 Πd(xd) ≈ 906. Hence, the above trigger strategy
supports the ﬁrst best outcome.
Appendix B
Implications of risk aversion for the ﬁrst best solution
Let u(πt) be each player’s utility from monetary return πt in period t where u′ > 0 and
u′′ ≤ 0. If the players are risk averse, then u′′ < 0. Suppose u(πt) replaces πt in each player’s





14Let S∗rn (S∗ra) be the ﬁrst-best steady state stock for the original inﬁnite-horizon model
when the players are risk neutral (risk averse). Let S∗rn
cum (S∗ra
cum) be the corresponding steady
state under the cumulative payment scheme, and S∗rn
lp (S∗ra
lp ) be the steady state under the
last-period payment scheme.
Here we prove that the ﬁrst-best actions are more myopic under the cumulative payment
scheme than under the inﬁnite-horizon game when the players are risk averse.
Proposition 1 For the model speciﬁed with equations (5) and (6), the following holds for
the steady states under alternative payment schemes.
(i) The steady states under the inﬁnite-horizon model with objective function given by (1’)
and under the last-period payment scheme are the same regardless of the players’ risk
attitudes, i.e. S∗rn = S∗rn
lp and S∗ra = S∗ra
lp .
(ii) The steady states under the inﬁnite-horizon model and under the cumulative payment
scheme are equivalent if the players are risk neutral: S∗rn = S∗rn
cum.
(iii) If players are risk averse, then the ﬁrst-best steady state under the cumulative payment




Proof. Part (i) follows because the expressions in equations (1) and (4) represent the same
payoﬀs regardless of whether πt’s are replaced with u(πt)’s. Part (ii) holds given (1) and (2)
and because we have u(πi) = πi (without loss of generality) under risk neutrality. To show
part (iii), ﬁrst we show that S∗ra = S∗rn: the ﬁrst-best steady state is the same regardless of
whether the players’ objective function is given by (1’) or (1) (i.e. whether the players are
risk averse or not). Given the utility function u, the ﬁrst best solution solves the following
functional equation:





u(B(xi) − dS) + δV (S
′)
subject to S′ = λS + X and xi ≥ 0 for all i, where V is the optimal value function (the
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This condition for the ﬁrst-best steady-state token is the same under any risk attitude.
Hence, S∗ra = S∗rn = S∗.
We now show that S∗ra
cum > S∗. Under the cumulative payment scheme, the expected











As speciﬁed in the Section 3, let πt = B(xit)−dSt and St+1 = λSt+Xt where Xt =
 N
i=1 xit
and µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint St+1 = λSt + Xt. Let
Πt ≡
 t







′(xit) + ··· − µt = 0,




′(Πt+1)D − ··· = 0,
for t = 1,2,... where D ≡
 N
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+ {(1 − λ)B
′(x) − D}{u
′(Πt) + pu
′(Πt+1) + ...} = 0.
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16This is the steady-state condition for the ﬁrst best solution under risk neutrality (equation 8).




















The last inequality implies B′(x) <
pD
1−pλ. Because B′′ < 0, this inequality implies that the
steady-state solution x under the cumulative payment scheme is larger than the steady-state
solution speciﬁed by (8). Hence, S∗ra
cum > S∗ = S∗
lp.
Remark. It is straightforward to show that the same properties hold for the Markov-perfect
equilibrium steady-state stocks under alternative payment schemes (i.e. equivalence of the
inﬁnite-horizon model and the last-period payment scheme, and a larger steady state under
the cumulative payment scheme). The same properties regarding the last-period and cumula-
tive payment schemes hold in other general contexts such as neoclassical growth models (Lei
and Noussair 2002) and inﬁnitely repeated games (as opposed to a special class of dynamic
games considered here).
Appendix C
An example of subject payoﬀ table
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
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Variable Mean Mean Mean p‐value, p‐value, p‐value,
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) Cum==Last Cum==Random Last==Random
game length, periods 7 5.67 6 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
(1.67) (3.39) (4.10)
first period group tokens  16.17 14.33 16.17 n/s n/s n/s
(4.92) (6.44) (4.22)
last period group tokens 12.50 15.50 18.17 0.066 0.0022 n/s
(2.07) (5.75) (1.72)
average group tokens 13.56 14.17 17.83 n/s 0.0076 n/s
(1.49) (5.61) (2.42)
avg tokens, early (periods 1‐4) 14.33 14.19 17.29 n/s 0.0325 n/s
(2.16) (6.59) (3.03)
avg tokens, late (periods 5‐end) 12.69 14.00 17.43 n/s 0.0095 0.1649
(1.93) (2.59) (2.35)
Number of obs (games), all 6 6 6
Number of obs (games) of length above 46 2 4
Signrank test p‐value, First==Last period 0.0938 n/s n/s
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Cumulative/Last period
Random










Group Tokens under Cumulative 
Pay
Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4










Group Tokens under 
Last Period Pay
Game 3 Game 4
Game 5 Game 6










Group Tokens under 
Random Period Pay
Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4















Group Tokens under Cumulative 
Pay
Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4












Group Tokens under 
Last Period Pay
Game 3 Game 4
Game 5 Game 6










123456789 1 0 1 1
period
Group Tokens under 
Random Period Pay
Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4




Payoffs with Group Tokens = 21 in each series
Your Tokens Payoff Level 123456789 1 0 1 1
Payoff in this series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff  in the next series 910 -483 -197 37 219 349 427 453 427 349 219 37
Payoff in two series ahead 765 -628 -342 -108 74 204 282 308 282 204 74 -108
Payoff in three series ahead 722 -671 -385 -151 31 161 239 265 239 161 31 -151
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Payoff in this series Payoff  in the next series
Payoff in two series ahead Payoff in three series ahead
Payoff in four series aheadExperimental Instructions (BL)
Introduction
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision making in which you will
earn money based on the decisions you make. All earnings you make are yours to keep and will be
paid to you IN CASH at the end of the experiment. During the experiment all units of account will
be in experimental dollars. Upon concluding the experiment the amount of experimental dollars you
receive as payoﬀ will be converted into dollars at the conversion rate of US $1 per experimental
dollars, and will be paid to you in private.
Do not communicate with the other participants except according to the speciﬁc rules of the exper-
iment. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. An experimenter will come over to you and
answer your question in private.
In this experiment you are going to participate in a decision process along with several other
participants. From now on, you will be referred to by your ID number. Your ID number will be
assigned to you by the computer.
Decisions and Earnings
Decisions in this experiment will occur in a number of decision series. At the beginning of the ﬁrst
decision series, you will be assigned to a decision group with 2 other participant(s). You will not be
told which of the other participants are in your decision group. What happens in your group has no
eﬀect on the participants in other groups and vice versa. The group composition will stay the same for
the whole experiment.
In each series, you will be asked to order between 1 and 11 tokens. All participants in your group
will make their orders at the same time. You payoﬀ from each series will depend on two things: (1) the
current payoﬀ level for your group, and (2) the number of tokens you order. The higher is the group
payoﬀ level for the series, the higher are your payoﬀs in this series. All members of your group have
the same group payoﬀ level in this series.
Given a group payoﬀ level, the relationship between the number of tokens you order and your payoﬀ
may look something like this:
PAYOFF SCHEDULE IN THIS SERIES; GROUP PAYOFF LEVEL: 1394
Your token order 1 23456789 1 0 1 1
Payoﬀ in this series 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
For example, the table above indicates that the group payoﬀ level in this series is 1394. At this
level, if you choose to order 5 tokens, then your payoﬀ will be 833 experimental dollars.
The group payoﬀ level for the ﬁrst series will be given to you by the computer. The payoﬀ level for your
group in the next series will depend on your group’s total token order in this series. Your group payoﬀ
1level in the next series may increase if the number of tokens ordered by the group in this series is low;
Your group payoﬀ level in the next series may decrease if the number of tokens ordered by the group
in this series is high; For some group token order, your group payoﬀ level in the next series may be the
same as in this series.
Example 1 To illustrate how your payoﬀ schedule may change from series to series, depending
on your group orders, consider the attachment called “Example 1 Scenarios”. Suppose, as in this
attachment, that your group has a payoﬀ level of 1394 in the current series. The table and ﬁgure A1
illustrate how the payoﬀs change from series to series if your group orders the sum of 3 tokens in each
series. The table shows the group payoﬀ level will increase from 1394 in this series to 1878 in the next
series, resulting in increased payoﬀs from token orders. For example, if you order 1 token, your payoﬀ
will be 1 experimental dollar in this series, but in the next series your payoﬀ from the same order will
increase to 485 experimental dollars. The table also shows that if the group order is again 3 tokens in
the next series, the group payoﬀ level will further increase in the series after next. Similarly, the table
demonstrates the payoﬀ changes in the future series up to three series ahead. The graph illustrates.
When making token orders, you will be given a calculator which will help you estimate the eﬀect
of your and the other participants’ token choices on the payoﬀ levels in the future series. In fact, you
will have to use this calculator before you can order your tokens.
TRY THE CALCULATOR ON YOUR DECISION SCREEN NOW. In the calculator box,
enter ”1” for your token order, and ”2” for the sum of the other participants’ orders. (The group tokens
will be then equal to 3.) The ”Calculator Outcome” box will show the changes in the payoﬀ levels and
the actual payoﬀs from the current series to the next and up to four series ahead, if these token orders
are chosen in every series. Notice how the payoﬀ levels and the actual payoﬀs increase from series to
series.
Consider now the table and ﬁgure A4. They illustrate how group payoﬀ levels change from series
to series if your group orders the total of 30 tokens in each series. Suppose, for example, that you order
11 tokens in this series. The table shows that, given the current payoﬀ level, your payoﬀ will be 521
experimental dollar in this series, but in the next series your payoﬀ from the same order will be -446
experimental dollars. (This is because the group payoﬀ level will decrease from 1394 in this series to
427 in the next series.) Again, the table and the graph illustrate how the payoﬀs change in the future
series up to three series ahead, assuming that the total group order stays at 30 tokens in each series.
TRY THE CALCULATOR WITH THE NEW NUMBERS NOW. In the calculator box, enter
”11” for your token order, and ”19” for the sum of the other participants’ orders. (The group tokens
will be then equal to 30.) The ”Calculator Outcome” box will again show the changes in the payoﬀ
levels and the actual payoﬀs from the current series to the next and up to four series ahead, given the
new token orders. Notice how the payoﬀ levels and the actual payoﬀs decrease from series to series.
2Now try the calculator with some other numbers.
After you practice with the calculator, ENTER A TOKEN ORDER IN THE DECISION BOX.
The decision box is located on your decision screen below the calculator box.
Predictions Along with making your token order, you will be also asked to predict the sum of
token orders by other participants in your group. You will get an extra 50 experimental dollars for
an accurate prediction. Your payoﬀ from prediction will decrease with the diﬀerence between your
prediction and the actual tokens ordered by others in your group. The table below explains how you
payoﬀ from prediction depends on how accurate your prediction is.
PAYOFF FROM PREDICTIONS
Diﬀerence between predicted and
actual sum of others’ tokens 02468 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
Your Payoﬀ from Prediction 50 50 48 46 42 38 32 26 18 10 0
PLEASE ENTER A PREDICTION INTO THE DECISION BOX NOW.
Results After all participants make their token orders and predictions, the computer will display the
“Results” screen, which will inform you about your token order, the sum of the other participants’
tokens, and your total payoﬀ in this series. Your total payoﬀ equals the sum of your payoﬀ from token
order and your payoﬀ from prediction. The results screen will also inform you about the change in the
payoﬀ levels from this series to the next series, and display the corresponding payoﬀ schedules.
Trials In each series, you will be given three independent decision trials to make your token orders
and predictions. The payoﬀ levels for your group will stay the same across the trials of a given series.
At the end of the series, the computer will randomly choose one of these three trials as a paid trial.
This paid trial will determine your earnings for this series, and the payoﬀ level for your group in the
next series. All other trials will be unpaid. At the end of the series, the series results screen will inform
you which trial is chosen as the paid trial for this series.
Advice for the next series At the end of each decision series, after the participants are informed
about the results in this series, each participant in your group will be asked to send an advice message
to other participants in the group, suggesting number of tokens to be chosen by each participant if their
decisions were to continue. This will conclude a given series.
PLEASE ENTER AN ADVICE (A SUGGESTED NUMBER OF TOKENS AND A VER-
BAL ADVICE) NOW.
3Continuation to the next decision series Upon conclusion of each series, we will roll an eight-
sided die to determine whether the experiment ends or continues to the next series. If the die comes
up with a number between 1 and 6, then the experiment continues to the next series. If the die shows
number 7 or 8, then the experiment stops. Thus, there are THREE CHANCES OUT OF FOUR that
the experiment continues to the next series, and ONE CHANCE OUT OF FOUR that the experiments
stops.
If the experiment continues, each new series that follows will be identical to the previous one except
for the possible group payoﬀ level change that was explained above. You will be given the new payoﬀ
table at the beginning of the new series.
Practice Before making decisions in the paid series, all participants will go through 5-series practice,
with each practice series consisting of one trial only. You will receive a ﬂat payment of 10 dollars for
the practice.
Total payoﬀ Your total payoﬀ in this experiment will consist of two parts: (1) The ﬂat payment for
the practice; plus (2) the payoﬀ for the LAST series, i.e., the series after which your experiment ends.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come by to answer your question.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Frequently asked questions
• What is the diﬀerence between a trial and a series?
Each series consists of three decision trials. One of the decision trials is then randomly chosen
by the computer to determine your payoﬀs in this series.
• What does my payoﬀ in this series depend upon?
It depends upon your GROUP PAYOFF LEVEL in this series, and YOUR TOKEN ORDER.
• What is the group payoﬀ level?
It is a positive number that is related to the payoﬀs you can get from token orders in the series.
The higher is the group payoﬀ level, the higher is the payoﬀ you get from any token order.
• Does my payoﬀ in a series depend upon other participants’ token orders in this series?
No. Given your group payoﬀ level in a series, your payoﬀ in this series is determined only by
your own tokens order.
4• Why do the total group tokens matter?
Because THEY AFFECT THE PAYOFF LEVEL IN THE NEXT SERIES for your group. The
higher is the group tokens in this series, the lower will be the payoﬀs in the next series.
• How many series are there in this experiment?
The number of series will be determined by a random draw. There will be 3 OUT OF 4 CHANCES
that each series will continue to the next series, and 1 OUT OF 4 CHANCE that the experiment
will stop after this series. We will roll a die to determine the outcome.
5Example 1 Scenarios
A1. Payoff with Group Tokens = 3 in each series
Your Tokens Payoff Level 123456789 1 0 1 1
Payoff in this series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff  in the next series 1878 485 771 1,005 1,187 1,317 1,395 1,421 1,395 1,317 1,187 1,005
Payoff in two series ahead 2023 630 916 1,150 1,332 1,462 1,540 1,566 1,540 1,462 1,332 1,150
Payoff in three series ahead 2066 673 959 1,193 1,375 1,505 1,583 1,609 1,583 1,505 1,375 1,193
Payoff in four series ahead 2079 686 972 1,206 1,388 1,518 1,596 1,622 1,596 1,518 1,388 1,206
A2. Payoff with Group Tokens = 12 in each series
Your Tokens Payoff Level 123456789 1 0 1 1
Payoff in this series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff  in the next series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff in two series ahead 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff in three series ahead 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff in four series ahead 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
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A3. Payoff with Group Tokens = 21 in each series
Your Tokens Payoff Level 123456789 1 0 1 1
Payoff in this series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff  in the next series 910 -483 -197 37 219 349 427 453 427 349 219 37
Payoff in two series ahead 765 -628 -342 -108 74 204 282 308 282 204 74 -108
Payoff in three series ahead 722 -671 -385 -151 31 161 239 265 239 161 31 -151
Payoff in four series ahead 709 -684 -398 -164 18 148 226 252 226 148 18 -164
A4. Payoff with Group Tokens = 30 in each series
Your Tokens Payoff Level 123456789 1 0 1 1
Payoff in this series 1394 1 287 521 703 833 911 937 911 833 703 521
Payoff  in the next series 427 -966 -680 -446 -264 -134 -56 -30 -56 -134 -264 -446
Payoff in two series ahead 137 -1,256 -970 -736 -554 -424 -346 -320 -346 -424 -554 -736
Payoff in three series ahead 50 -1,343 -1,057 -823 -641 -511 -433 -407 -433 -511 -641 -823
Payoff in four series ahead 23 -1,370 -1,084 -850 -668 -538 -460 -434 -460 -538 -668 -850
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Payoff in four series aheadPost‐Experiment Questionnaire 
What do you think is the best number of tokens to order and why?
How did you make your decision to order?
How many tokens would you order if you are to participate again in this experiment?
How easy to understand were the instructions?
Was the main screen well organized?
Did you find yourself getting bored by the end?
Are you still glad you came (knowing that you are about to get paid)?
How many economics courses have you taken so far?
What is your major?
Please add any additional comments below 